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RECENT DECISIONS
AGBNCY-APPAimNT AurnoRITY OF SALES AaBNT-Defendant's agent, a
consignee of automobiles for sale, received from plaintiff a used truck, and
agreed to apply the proceeds from the sale of the truck to the purchase price
of a new automobile, to be sold and delivered to plaintiff when available.
Defendant's agent sold the truck and absconded with the proceeds from such
sale. Plaintiff sued for the value of the truck, and the lower court rendered
judgment in his favor. On appeal, held, affirmed. The acts of the agent bound
the defendant, although the agency contract gave only express authority to
sell new automobiles. Correa v. Duality Motor Co., (Cal. App. 1953) 257
P. (2d) 738.
The court in this case found that there was a general custom or usage in
the automobile business allowing dealers to accept used vehicles as part
payment on the purchase price of new cars. It stated that the parties to the
agency contract "are deemed to have contracted in -reference to the usage
unless the contrary appears; that the usage forms a part of the contract. . • ."1
Applying a relevant California statute,2 the court then held that the agent
acted with actual authority. In light of the statute, this result may be considered sound. However, insofar as the decision rests upon the well-established
common law ground that a principal may become bound to third persons by
acts within the apparent authority of the agent,3 the :reasoning of the court
is open to some question. Under California decisions, a plaintiff may not
recover from a principal on the basis of the apparent authority of the agent
without a s}iowing of facts sufficient to raise an estoppel.4 1bis requires, of
course, representations or conduct on the part of the principal, and reasonable
reliance thereon by the third person. The sole conduct of the principal in
the present case consisted of investing his agent with less actual authority
than is usually given to agents in a similar position. It would appear that
this conduct should be sufficient, since if more were required, e.g., an affirmative manifestation to the third person by the principal, too great a burden
would be placed on those who deal in established markets.6 But it ·would
also appear that more than the mere fact of reliance should be necessary to

1 Principal case at 741, quoting from Hind v. Oriental Products Co., Inc., 195 Cal. 655
at 667, 235 P. 438 (1925). Accord: Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond v. Malloy, 264
U.S. 160, 44 S.Ct. 296 (1924); Continental Coal Co. v. Birdsall, (4th Cir. 1901) 108 F.
882.
2 Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1949) §2316 provides: "Actual authority is such as the
principal intentionally confers upon the agent, or intentionally, or by want of ordinary care,
allows the agent to believe himself to possess."
s 1 MEcm11r, AGENCY, 2d ed., §720 (1914).
_
4 Hobart v. Hobai:t Estate Co., 26 Cal. (2d) 412, 159 P. (2d) 958 (1945).
GCf. Ellis v. Nelson, 68 Nev. 410,233 P. (2d) 1072 (1951); Federal Supply Co. v.
Wichita Sales & Supply Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) 232 S.W. 879; Te.~as Wine & Liquor
Co. v. Willis, (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) 239 S.W. (2d) 695. But cf. Berryhill v. Ellett,
(10th Cir. 1933) 64 F. (2d) 253.
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complete the picture of estoppel. Courts often require that the plaintiff be
a person of ordinary prudence, reasonably conversant with business usages
and customs,6 and that he exercise reasonable diligence in determining the
nature and extent of the agent's authority.7 It is believed that these requirements are eminently reasonable. As the court in the principal case says, if
the loss must fall upon one of two "innocent" persons,8 it seems completely
fair to require that the one who is relieved of the loss make a showing that
no lack of reasonable care on his part was instrumental in bringing about the
loss. In the present case there was no showing that the plaintiff made an
inquiry even of the agent as to whether the agent's act in taldng the used
truck was authorized by his principal.
The general rule that in the absence of a trade usage to the contrary, an
authority to sell does not carxy with it an authority to barter or exchange,0
is not strictly applicable to the facts of this case, since a contrary trade usage
did exist. However, the court does not consider the fact that here there was
no sale at all, outright or in exchange for the truck; there was merely an
agreement to sell in the future. In another case10 having substantially
identical facts, the court noted that the sale was merely executory, not included
within the custom or usage 0£ the trade, and said: "••• we are of the opinion
the transaction had by plaintiff with the salesman appears to be rather unusual. • . ."U. It was therefore held that in order to justify a finding that
the act of the agent in accepting the used truck was within the apparent
authority of the agent, proof would be required of similar previous dealings
between the agent and the plaintiff or between the agent and the third persons.
Since this proof was not made, the principal was not liable for the value of
the truck upon its conversion by the agent.
Despite the court's questionable reasoning on the facts of the principal
case, it is perhaps not too much to require as a general rule that a businessman
who desires to invest his agent ·with less authority than that usually possessed
by agents in a similar position must display the terms of the agency contract
in the agent's place of business, on sales slips, contracts, etc. No case has
been found considering the effectiveness of such means of giving notice. But
it would seem that if these steps fail to protect the principal, the businessman
may come to regard certain elements of an important and valuable business
relationship-the sales agency-as too highly charged ·with danger for general
use.
William D. Keeler
6 E.g., Texas Wine & Liquor Co. v. Willis, note 5 supra,
7 Spann v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co. of Dallas, Texas,

(8th Cir. 1936) 82 F.
(2d) 593; 1 M.Emm11r, AGENCY, 2d ed., §§725, 726 (1914), and cases cited. But see
Federal Supply Co. v. Wichita Sales & Supply Co., note 5 supra.
8 Prlncipal case at 742. Accord, Commercial Solvents, Inc. v. D. A. Jobnson and T. L.
Bailey, 235 N.C. 237, 69 S.E. (2d) 716 (1952).
9 C.J.S., Agency §§104, 114 (1936), and cases cited.
10 Salley v. Jones Motor Co., 12 La. App. 150, 125 S. 599 (1929).
11 Id. at 152.

